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In his article “Different conceptions of
mental illness: consequences for the asso-
ciation with patients” Helmchen rightly
cautions against any kind of dogmatism
in psychiatry, regardless of whether it is
a social, a psychological or a biological
one. Instead, he favors the biopsychosocial
model as a remedy for “the narrow-
ing of conceptions that depict only par-
tial aspects of mental illness” (Helmchen,
2013, p. 3). The main criticism of this
model is traditionally that it “borders on
anarchy” because one can emphasize the
“bio” if one wishes, or the “psycho” [. . . ],
or the “social.” There is “no rationale
why one heads in one direction or the
other” (Ghaemi, 2009, p. 3). Against this
alleged arbitrariness and vagueness of the
integrative model Helmchen recommends
basing it “on scientifically proven con-
cepts” (Helmchen, 2013, p. 4). Yet, it is
not quite clear in which relation the three
elements of the integrative model should
stand and what its proposed grounding on
scientifically proven concepts amounts to.
I assume that the biopsychosocial model
either has to be based on biological facts
or else it will remain arbitrary. But if it
is based on biological facts—even if not
exclusively—it will probably be charged
with “biologism” in just the same way as
current accounts of biological psychiatry.
It is certainly true that a dogmatic
overemphasis of the physiological side
of the disorder-coin is ill-advised and
in all likelihood to the disadvantage of
the patient. Whether biological theories
of the mind are in fact utterly brain-
focused is, however, a point of contention.
Admittedly, there are indeed voices that
urge the concept of mental illness to be
replaced by an account of brain disease
(Bickle, 2006; Akil et al., 2010; Holsboer,
2010; White et al., 2012). But the vast
majority of biological psychiatrists does
try to understand the patient’s personal
situation. Even a hardboiled reductionist
cannot avoid asking the respective patient
about what she “feels.” The reason is sim-
ply that it is up to now impossible to
read off the brain whether someone feels
depressed or not, whether she has delu-
sions or not. The causes of a mental
illness on the one hand and the symp-
toms on the other are to be found on
different levels. This points to the dis-
tinction between “explaining” and “under-
standing” Jaspers is so often cited with
and which even a biological psychia-
trist cannot—and will not—ignore. In his
General Psychopathology Jaspers explains:
“The units of phenomenology (e.g.,
hallucinations, modes of perception,
etc.) are explained by bodily events.
Complex meaningful connections in
their turn are considered as units (e.g., a
manic syndrome plus all its contents can
be regarded as the effect of a cerebral pro-
cess or of some emotional trauma such
as the death of an intimate.”) (Jaspers,
1963, p. 305, my italics).
Biological psychiatry is sometimes
regarded as nothing but an ideology
(Berger, 2001; McLaren, 2010; at least
implicitly also Cohen, 1993). On a closer
look, things are not that simple. In actual
fact, when Helmchen defends the integra-
tive model as a “didactic tool” (Helmchen,
2013, p. 4), this comes quite near even to
Bickle who declares within his “ruthless
reductionism” that “[h]euristically, higher
level investigations and explanations are
essential to neuroscience’s development”
(Bickle, 2006, p. 428). Similarly, Insel
and Quirion who demand “that mental
disorders be understood and treated as
brain disorders” emphasize “the need for
a sophisticated understanding of inter-
personal relationships along with the use
of evidence-based, nonpharmacological
treatments” (Insel and Quirion, 2005,
p. 2223). Last but not least, Kandel—
who, too, is usually regarded a radical
reductionist—explains that it “would
be unfortunate, even tragic, if the rich
insights that have come from psychoanal-
ysis were to be lost in the rapprochement
between psychiatry and the biological
sciences” (Kandel, 1998, p. 467).
What is, then, the difference between
the biological and the biopsychoso-
cial model as Helmchen conceives it?
According to the first, mental illness as
a phenomenon can be understood on the
level of the patient’s experiences and be
explained biologically. According to the
latter, the psychological and social levels
are essential for an adequate understand-
ing of mental illness, but both should to
be based on scientific proven concepts.
The much criticized biological psychiatry
seems not to be very different from the
integrative, scientifically based model.
A critic may object that the searched-
for foundation of the biopsychosocial
model of mental illness does not at all
need to be a biological one. What about
Psychology? Isn’t it a science, too, with
proven concepts? The answer to this objec-
tion is—in a nutshell—2-fold. Either psy-
chology is a science or it is not. If it is, it
is unavoidable to bring it into accordance
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with biology, which undoubtedly is a
science as well. In cases of theoretical
conflict we would need a criterion to
decide which concept (or theory, or law)
should be given priority. The crucial ques-
tion, then, is whether the “bio,” the “psy-
cho,” or the “social” should be the maestro
in the orchestra of concepts.
If, on the other hand, psychology is
not a science, the psychologist will simply
not be able to provide the “scientifically
proven concepts” which are so necessary
to mitigate the lurking arbitrariness of the
biopsychosocial model of mental illness.
It is one thing to use a conception as an
auxiliary means for an adequate under-
standing of something and quite another
to make use of it as a scientific foundation.
To sum up, the biopsychosocial model
of mental illness is valuable as a reminder
that there is more to mental illness than
brain functions. Seen as a theory, it will
either be based on biology and meet sim-
ilar trouble as the so called biologism in
psychiatry, or else it will indeed be vague
and border on anarchy.
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